Learning about common and private values in oligopoly

We characterize a duopoly buffeted by demand and cost shocks. Firms learn about shocks from common observation, private observation, and noisy price signals. Firms internalize how outputs affect a rival's signal, and hence output. We distinguish how the nature of information —public versus private—and of what firms learn about—common versus private values—affect equilibrium outcomes. Firm outputs weigh private information about private values by more than common values. Thus, prices contain more information about private‐value shocks.     

Brand competition in CPG industries: Sustaining large local advantages with little product differentiation

In direct competition between national brands of consumer packaged goods (CPG), one brand often has a large local share advantage over the other despite the similarity of the branded products. I present an explanation for these large and persistent advantages in the context of local competition on perceived quality or brand image. The main result of the analysis is a relation between varying degrees of product similarity and equilibrium outcomes of local share advantages. Namely, I find that asymmetric quality positioning and associated local share advantages emerge especially when competing brands are objectively similar. Conversely, local share asymmetries based on brand positioning occur less when brands are dissimilar. This paper provides two reinforcing intuitions for this result. First, if brands are objectively similar, different levels of investment in local quality perceptions co-exist in equilibrium in the same market, because this investment is often borne as fixed cost. Also, early movers will invest in high perceived quality, whereas late movers have less incentive to invest because of demand sharing and increased price competition. Second, if the local advantages are shared by competitors across markets, the persistence of these advantages is reinforced by multimarket contact. Even when local brand building is free, firms may not want to improve perceived quality in their “weak” markets if it initiates retaliation by the competition in their “strong” markets. The increase in multimarket profits from collusion is large when the products are similar, because price competition looms large.

Entry,spending and firm size in a stochastic R&D race

A model is developed to explain participation and spending on R&D as a function of firm size. The R&D process is represented as an n-participant race with a Poisson incidence of success, where the winner takes all during some protection period. Four effects of scale are taken into account: a sunk fixed threshold cost of entry; a flow cost of expenditure for the duration of the race, which affects both the profitability of winning and the speed of development (the Poisson parameter), both with diminishing returns; allowance for an effect of firm size on the effectiveness (profit/cost) of development. The operational decision concerning the level and intensity of commitment in case of participation is modelled in a traditional fashion as the maximization of expected returns. The strategic decision whether or not to participate (at an optimal level and intensity) is modelled as a stochastic process of deliberation between different makers and influencers of decisions in the firm. The latter is to be seen as an introduction of the political and resource dependence views of organisations. The resulting model of R&D participation as a function of firm size is tested empirically on data from an R&D survey in the Netherlands.     

Liquidity and the marginal value of information

We revisit Kyle’s (Econometrica 53:1315–1335, 1985) model of price formation in the presence of private information. We begin by using Back’s (Rev Financ Stud 5(3):387–409, 1992) approach, demonstrating that if standard assumptions are imposed, the model has a unique equilibrium solution and that the insider’s trading strategy has a martingale property. That in turn implies that the insider’s strategies are linear in total order flow. We also show that for arbitrary prior distributions, the insider’s trading strategy is uniquely determined by a Doob $h$ -transform that expresses the insider’s informational advantage. This allows us to reformulate the model so that Kyle’s liquidity parameter $\lambda $ is characterized by a Lagrange multiplier that is the marginal value or shadow price of information. Based on these findings, we can then interpret liquidity as the marginal value of information.     

Bamyan: Whose Heritage Was It and What Should We Do About It?

The destruction for ostensibly ideological reasons of the Buddhist statues at Bamyan in Afghanistan by the Taliban (whether or not inspired by Al-Qaeda) raises a number of wider issues. Apart from the problems of minority, dissonant and enclave heritage, there is the question, 'how can relics of the past that are valued in different ways by local, national and international claimants be managed in a way that satisfies all parties?' The idea of world heritage, and its manifestation in international tourism, may conflict with heritage used for local or national purposes. One, if not the most important, actor in this arena, UNESCO, is evaluated on the basis of its goals and efficiency in saving the heritage of mankind in the recent past. The dilemmas inherent in the concept of world heritage and possible solutions for its management are outlined.     

The effect of distance and road quality on food collection, marketing margins, and traders' wages: evidence from the former Zaire

Food price variation is typical of the food economies of many low income countries. The presence or absence of road infrastructure is perceived to be one of the main determinants of this variation. This analysis shows that in the case of the former Zaire, food price dispersion is significant both across products and across regions. It is demonstrated that transportation costs explain most of the differences in food prices between producer regions and that road quality is an important factor in the transportation costs. However, food prices decrease relatively faster than transportation costs increase and traders' wages are higher on bad roads.     

Estimating international technology spillovers using technology flow matrices

Estimating International Technology Spillovers Using Technology Flow Matrices. — This paper investigates the impact of international R &; D spillovers on sectoral growth patterns in OECD countries. It applies panel regression techniques to a time-series cross-section panel. It arrives at the conclusion that knowledge spillovers are an important contributor to economic growth. The estimation results are applied in the form of a ‘simulation’ of TFP growth per country, splitting (R &; D-related) TFP into a component due to domestic R &; D and one due to foreign R &; D. The results also show that the United States and Germany are the most influential countries in terms of contributions to other countries’ TFP growth.